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Abstract
Considering the click fraud in the online advertising 
market, a basic game theoretic model for click fraud is 
built firstly. In this model, the Ads Network can choose 
to make click fraud supervision or trust, and advertising 
publishers can choose to publish advertisement honestly 
or to cheat. In this paper, we get the result of the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium solution firstly and then we 
extend the model to the 2-supervision game model, and 
then discuss the effect factors when the Ads network is 
punished due to click fraud. Further more, the model 
considers the influence on click fraud caused by the 
competitions between the multi-publishers and then get 
the new result of the Nash equilibrium solution. Based 
on the analysis above, click fraud can be effectively 
prevented in the following ways: intensifying the 
supervision and control process, implementing penalty 
on advertising network, reducing information asymmetry, 
choosing the honest publisher to publish advertisement, 
building the competitive mechanism, evaluating the online 
advertising effectiveness in time, and signing detailed 
operational contract in advance.
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With the growth of the web as a marketing medium, 
online advertising has become increasingly important 
for advertisers to promote their products and services, 
and for numerous websites to get significant cash flow. 
Since search engine tycoon Google implemented the 
business model of click charges, click charge has become 
popular. However, there brings out a great amount of 
advertising click fraud in internet advertising market 
with the emergence of click charge. Click fraud refers 
to a natural person or organization with fraud intent to 
obtain illegitimate interests or consume rival’s advertising 
budget using automation scripts, computer programs or 
employing natural persons to imitate legitimate web users 
to click on the online advertising. You never know if the 
other end of Internet is your real customers, or a click 
fraud dog! This is a great irony on click fraud phenomenon 
for the Internet advertising market. Nowadays, click fraud 
may be the main fraud behavior in online advertisement 
market[1-3]. This kind of fraud behavior not only severely 
harms the interests of the advertisers, but also causes 
negative influence for the reputation of network media, 
and at the same time, seriously hinders the development 
of e-commerce and Internet advertising market.
The Internet tycoon Yahoo was complained for 
not fully protecting the interests of advertisers, and 
thus advertisers suffered from the click fraud in 2005. 
According to the settlement, Yahoo would not only 
pay about $5 million legal fees, but also to postpone 
the deadline for accepting click fraud complaints from 
its advertisers. Search engine tycoon Google was also 
complained by several companies in the same year. 
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Google agreed to pay $90 million fees in mediating 
a settlement in March 2006[4]. Zhong Bei Wei Ke, a 
medical research institute in Beijing, protested malicious 
click fraud of Baidu Company and took Baidu to court 
in August 2006[5]. The network advertising click frauds 
attracted extensive attention of the society.
The researchers in Outsell Inc Company announced a 
random survey results about 407 advertisers in June2006, 
which showed that in the previous year, click fraud 
accounted for almost 14.6% of total expenditures of online 
advertising, amounted to $0.8 billion. 27% of advertisers 
have to reduce or stop the mode of CPC, and 16% of 
customers claimed that they had completely stopped CPC 
online advertising. 75% of respondents claimed that they 
had suffered from click fraud, 7% of respondents had 
requested for refund, and got the $9507 back on average[4].
As suggested by the data analysis above, click fraud 
makes advertisers and network media suffer huge losses, 
and the pay-per-click model has been questioned because 
of click fraud, which gives rise to credibility crisis in 
Internet enterprises. This phenomenon hinders healthy 
development for online advertising. Many scholars are 
paying research attentions on how to protect online 
advertising from click fraud and how to monitor web 
advertising click fraud 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
review the literature regarding online advertisements 
involving click fraud. We also discuss operation in reality 
between Ads network and publisher. In Section 3, we first 
build the basic click fraud supervision model between Ads 
network and publisher, and then we extend the basic model 
to the 2-supervision between Ads network, publisher and 
advertiser. At last we extend the 2-supervision model to 
the supervision model with competition .We provide the 
managerial insights from click fraud supervision for Ads 
network and advertisers in Section 4. We make a summery 
of the study and point out the limits of the study and give 
a perspective in future further relating studies in Section 5.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
Domestic and foreign scholars have done a lot of research 
on how to effectively get rid of click fraud. There are four 
strategies, according to these researches: (1) to prevent 
click fraud by new techniques. Andrew Bortzt and Erika 
Chin (2009) established a set of detection system, which 
is built upon practical experience and desired objective, 
to prevent click fraud. They also simulated and developed 
the Camelot system to test click fraud, and this system 
is now used in the Google search engine[6]. Xuhua 
Ding (2010) developed a technique which combines 
cryptography and probability. By using this technology, 
click fraud that advertiser deceives the advertising media 
is prevented[7]. Bobji Mungamuru and Stephen Weis 
(2008) set up the advertising economic model of pay-
per-click, which stated the importance of filtering invalid 
click fraud from Ads network[8]. Hamed Haddadi (2010) 
presented Bluff Ads, a set of ads which are designed to be 
detected and clicked only by machines, or poorly trained 
click-fraud work force. This simple set of ads, mixed with 
ordinary ads, works as a litmus test, or a “Captcha” for 
the user legitimacy[9]. YuanJian and Zhang Jinsong (2009) 
et al proposed a strategy based on the graphic verification 
code to prevent click fraud[10], Zhang Zu-Lian proposed a 
combined algorithm based on verification code, viewing 
time and click frequency to prevent click fraud[11]. These 
strategies can effectively shield click fraud that is similar 
to the Trojan horse click software, therefore effectively 
shield browsers’ accidental unconscious invalid clicks, and 
significantly reduce the efficiency of artificial click fraud. 
(2) To prevent click fraud based on the legal sanctions and 
self-discipline .Wang Xianlin (2007) and Liu Chunnian 
(2008) et al deeply analyzed click fraud based on the 
unjust enrichment in terms of legal quality. On the basis 
of analysis, they proposed prevention measures, from 
the legal sanctions and self-discipline that aim at click 
fraud for network advertisement[12-13]. (3) To avoid click 
fraud based on management insights. Benjamin Edelman 
(2009) studied the commission which deferred payment to 
agents, and found it could reduce about 71% click fraud 
without lowering their profits[14]. Joshua Goodman (2005) 
proposed a method based on prior-match and display 
advertising in a random proportion, and the method can 
effective avoid click fraud and impression fraud[15]. Nicole 
Immorlica and Kamal Jain (2005) proposed a kind of 
learning algorithm based on click that can identify click 
fraud for a specific advertising slot[16]. (4) To prevent 
click fraud by introducing the third-party monitoring 
organizations. Sanjay Mittal and Rahul Gupta (2009) 
studied the impact of click fraud on the search engine 
business’ return under the full information and uncertain 
information, and they found that the interests of search 
engine industry would depend on the identification 
algorithm due to neutral third-party audit report with 
respect to click fraud[17]. Gao Zhijian thought that using 
the Internet advertising monitoring software of third-party 
to monitor the published network advertising can get the 
information on click ads. However, this approach might 
face the challenge of search engine enterprise; they would 
refuse to open backend data and explain questions, and 
even to challenge the monitoring results of third-party 
monitoring organizations[18].
Although there are many researches on click fraud, 
there is still inadequacy: because click fraud involves 
multi-stakeholders, which are advertisers, publishers 
and Ads network. In reality, advertisers are mostly 
dependent on professional Ads network or advertising 
agent to make and publish advertising. Ads network has 
rich advertising media resources. Ads network signs a 
contract on publishing advertisement with advertising 
media to finish the publishing. Therefore, click fraud 
involves stakeholders, advertisers, and a third party. The 
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aforementioned studies did not put the interests of the 
three parties as a whole to consider. This paper is trying 
to study the supervision issues of click fraud according 
to the three parties’ interest and propose some valuable 
management insights for Internet advertising market.
This paper mainly focuses on the following issues: 
(1) Introduce ideas of supply chain management, taking 
advertisers, Ads network and publisher as a whole 
stakeholder to study new ways of monitoring click fraud. 
(2) To measure the probability that publisher implemented 
click fraud by introducing measurable coefficient of 
advertising service effect, technology level coefficient 
of monitoring and credibility coefficient of publisher in 
the model. (3) To set a basic supervision game model 
between publisher and Ads network to derive Nash 
equilibrium solution of monitoring probability and 
discuss the relation of factors which affect click fraud 
by Nash equilibrium solution. (4) To extend the basic 
game model to 2-supervision model between advertisers, 
Ads network and publisher, and discuss the influence on 
click fraud when Ads network is punished. (5) Introduce 
competition mechanism among multi-publishers based 
on the 2-supervision model and discuss the influence of 
introducing competition mechanism for click fraud. We 
have meaningful enlightenment of online advertising 
management by the analysis of three supervision game 
model.
2.  MODEL SETTING AND ANALYSIS
2.1  Basic Symbols and Instructions
Table1  
Basic Symbols and Instructions
Symbol Instructions
 
A             Ads network (or advertising agent)
P             Online Advertising media (advertising publisher)
α              Measurement coefficient of advertisement effectiveness 
β               Technology level coefficient of monitor
ω               Credibility factor coefficient of advertising media 
n                 Impression number of online advertising
p                 Impression cost of online advertising  
c                 Clicks ratio of advertising
σ                 Clicks cost of web advertising 
a                  Marginal profit of Ads network 
b                 Marginal cost of publisher
C               Supervision costs of Ads network 
ρ                  The discovered probability of Click fraud  
χ                  The probability of supervision for Ads network
y                 The probability of publisher publish ads honestly 
Φ               Additional benefit due to Click fraud for publisher 
θ                  Penalty due to Click fraud for publisher 
ψ                 Penalty that Ads network suffered from advertisers  
δ                  Discount factor           
η                The benefits after Ads network was punished by advertiser
2.2  Setting 1-Supervision Game Model and 
Analysis
We assume that an Ads network A cooperates with 
a publisher P , while the publisher provides publishing 
advertisement in his website. Ads networks are dominant 
because they own rich media resources and advertisers, 
therefore they can choose publisher to match ads. 
However, advertising is the main profitable way for 
publisher. Publisher has two kinds of actions to choose 
when he publishes the advertising on Ads network: 
publish advertisement honestly or implement click fraud. 
The Ads network has also two kinds of actions: implement 
supervision or trust publisher. If the Ads network 
supervises the publisher then we can set supervision game 
model for click fraud.
Because of characterist ics with disguise and 
invisibility for click fraud, we should consider difficulties 
of monitoring factors in the supervision of click fraud, 
and we might as well assume the measuring coefficient of 
advertising effectiveness is α(0 < α < 1), and α  is relevant 
to features of advertising service and system of ads 
evaluation. In addition, we assume monitor technology 
level of Ads network is β .The higher is β , the lower is the 
possibility of click fraud; and vice versa. Meanwhile, the 
Ads network should consider the reputation and social 
comprehensive evaluation factors of publishers when 
it outsources advertising publishing to publisher. These 
factors will affect the Ads network’s choice of publisher 
and further influence quality of advertising publishing. We 
might as well name it as credibility factors ω(0 < ω < 1) 
for publisher. The higher is ω , the bigger is the probability 
that publisher publishes advertising honestly.
Supposing the advertiser outsources the advertisement 
business to Ads network completely, and then Ads 
network redistributes advertising business to publisher. 
Assuming Ads network and publisher distribute income 
according to the contract in advance, which is based on 
hybrid compensation of the impression and click-through 
rate, assuming the number of impression is n, impression 
cost is P , click-through rate is c  and click cost is σ . 
Supposing a  is marginal profit due to click-through rate of 
product or service, a > 0. Assuming b  is cost coefficient 
of publisher publishing ad, i.e. marginal cost ,and b > 0. If 
Ads network chooses supervision with cost C, publisher 
chooses to publish ads honestly, and then we can write the 
net profit for Ads network as:
πA1 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn − C                                           (1)
And net profit for publisher is:
πP1 = pn + σcn − bpn                                               (2)
If Ads network chooses supervision with cost C , 
publisher chooses to implement click fraud and the 
extra costs with E for publisher. The publisher gets the 
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additional net benefit with Φ  by deducting the extra effort 
cost. We assume the probability of click fraud is found 
with ρ(0 < ρ < 1) for publisher, which is closely related 
to monitor coefficient α , monitor technology level β  and 
credibility factor ω , higher α , β  and ω , then higher the ρ , 
we might as well define ρ = αβω. We define that publisher 
suffers penalty θ from click fraud, then the benefit of Ads 
network and publisher respectively are: 
πA2 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn − C + αβωθ                                 (3)
πP2 = pn + σcn − bpn + Φ − αβωθ                                    (4)
If Ads network chooses to believe publisher which 
publish advertising honestly, then the revenue of Ads 
network and publisher respectively are as follows: 
πA3 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn                                                    (5)
πP3 = pn + σcn − bpn                                                        (6)
Formulas (5) and (6) show that Ads network trusts 
the publisher who publishes advertisement honestly, Ads 
network and publisher get normal income. This is the 
ideal situation that market pursues, and the social welfare 
maximizes at this point. 
Assuming the Ads network chooses to trust publisher 
who chooses to make click fraud, then we can write the 
benefit of Ads network as:
πA4 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn                                                    (7)
And the benefit for publisher is:
πP4 = pn + σcn − bpn + Φ                                                   (8)
Therefore, we set extensive-form representation model 1 
as follows:
Assuming ads network chooses supervision with 
probability χ , and the probability of taking no supervision 
is 1− χ . Assuming publisher chooses to publish honestly 
with probability y , and then probability of click fraud 
is 1− y. So the expected benefit of Ads network can be 
expressed as follows:
πA(χ , y) = χyπA1 + χ(1 − y)πA2 + (1 − χ)yπA3 + (1 − χ)(1 − y)
πA4                                                                                    (9)
Put formulas (1), (3), (5) and (7) into formula (9), and 
then differentiating (9) with respect to , we have the first-
order conditions and can get the formula (10):
(10)
Solving equation (10), we can get y* as follows:
Expected benefit of publisher can be expressed as 
formula (11):
(11)
Put formula (2), (4), (6) and (8) into formula (11), and 
then differentiating (11) with respect to , we have the first-
order conditions and can get the formula (12):
(12)
Solving equation (12), we can get χ * as follows:
So we get mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution as 
formula (13):
(13)
Proposition 1 Supervision probability χ  for Ads network 
is in inversely proportional to α , β , ω , θ  and proportional 
to Φ ; probability of publishing honesty for publisher is 
proportional to α , β , ω , θ  and is inversely proportional to C.
Proof. we can get proposition 1 from formula 
and                   , the conclusion is obvious.
With the measurable degree α  of advertising service 
easy to measure, the higher is the monitor technology 
level β ,so is the credibility factor ω  for publisher, and the 
cost of penalty θ  for the publisher ,but the supervision 
Figure1  
1-Supervision Game Model1on Click Fraud
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probability is lower for the Ads network, and the 
probability y  is higher that publisher publishes online 
advertising honestly. Therefore, in cooperation with 
the process of publisher, the Ads network should study 
seriously identifiable system for the publishers’ behavior 
in order to increase identification probability α ; Ads 
network should improve monitor technology level β  to 
reduce the possibility of fraud; cooperate with reputable 
and the high qualified publisher as much as possible. On 
the other hand, Ads network should add the penalty in 
order to encourage publisher to publish advertisement 
honestly, and reduce the cost of supervision for Ads 
network.
Proposition 2 The basic conditions are C  ≤ αβωθ  
according to the contract in which Ads network cooperate 
with publisher.
Proof. As probability that publisher publishes online 
advertising honestly without doing click fraud must meet 
the conditions as following:
So, we can get the conclusion:
C  ≤ αβωθ            (QED)
Proposition 2 shows that supervision costs for Ads 
network must not be more than the compensation of click 
fraud αβωθ . Otherwise, once the supervision costs are 
more than αβωθ , both parties of contract can’t guarantee 
publishing advertising according to the contract.
Proposition 3 The more additional revenue Φ , the more 
supervision probability χ ; the more supervision cost C, 
the lower probability that publisher accomplishes the 
publishing ads honestly.
If the benefit of click fraud is greater for publisher, 
then the publisher has greater motivation to make click 
fraud, so it is more necessary to supervise publisher for 
the Ads network; publisher knows that supervision cost 
is higher and anticipates the possibility of supervision 
is lower for Ads network, then the possibility in which 
publisher makes click fraud is higher without publishing 
advertising honestly.
2.3  Setting 2-Supervision Game Model and 
Analysis
Now we extend further the model 1 to2-supervision game 
model, for the service supply chain, as illustrated with 
figure2, in the process of cooperation with publisher, 
not only does the Ads network consider supervising and 
working out a penalty θ  to publisher, but also advertiser 
consider working out a penalty ψ  to Ads network. Now we 
consider the impact with ψ  for supervision of click fraud.
Figure 2  
2-Supervision of Click Fraud
If Ads network chooses supervision with cost C and 
publisher chooses to publish honestly, therefore, we can 
write the net profit for Ads network as follows:
π'A1 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn − C                                          (14)
And net profit for publisher is:
π'P1 = pn + σcn − bpn                                             (15)
If the publisher chooses to make click fraud, then the 
publisher can get additional benefit Φ . If Ads network 
chooses supervision, then the probability of click fraud is 
found with for αβω  publisher. We assume the penalty is 
θ for publisher now. And probability of not finding click 
fraud is 1 − αβω , if the Ads network suffers penalty from 
advertiser with the penalty ψ, and then the benefit of Ads 
network and publisher respectively are as follows:
π'A2 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn − C + αβωθ − (1 − αβω)ψ       (16) 
π'P2 = pn + σcn − bpn + Φ − αβωθ                                 (17)
If Ads network chooses to trust publisher which 
publish advertising honestly, then the benefit of Ads 
network and publisher respectively are as follows:
π'A3 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn                                                  (18) 
π'P3 = pn + σcn − bpn                                                      (19)
Assuming the Ads network chooses to trust publisher 
which chooses to implement click fraud, then we can 
write the benefit of Ads network as follows:
π'A4 = − pn  − σcn  + aσcn − ψ                                          (20) 
And benefit for publisher is:
π'P4 = pn + σcn − bpn + Φ                                               (21) 
Therefore, we set extensive-form representation model 
2 as follows:
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And then differentiating (25) with respect to y, we have 
the first-order conditions and get the formula as follows:
 
Solving equation above, we can get χ' * as follows
 
 
So we get mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution as 
formula (26):
                                                                          (26) 
                                             
Proposition 4 It can reduce probability of supervision for 
Ads network and probability of click fraud for publisher if 
advertiser makes penalty to Ads network, and the higher ψ , 
the smaller the probability of click fraud.
Proof. As advertiser makes penalty ψ  to Ads network A, 
without loss of generality, the penalty θ  is greater than θ 0 
which Ads network punishes publisher before publisher 
has not been suffered from penalty. We might as well 
suppose θ 1  = θ 0  + ζ , without considering the advertiser 
punishes the Ads network with penalty ψ , so, there is the 
formula as follows:
When advertisers punish Ads network with penalty ψ , 
there is a formula as following:
Correspondingly, Compare χ 0
*, y 0* with χ' *, y' * it is 
obvious that in the case of Φ , C, α , ω  given, there must 
have the formulas that χ'* < χ0
*, y'* > y0* and χ'* < χ0*, 1− y'*< 
1 − y0*, i.e. Probability of supervision for Ads network and 
probability of click fraud for publisher are reduced.
Publisher publishes advertisement honestly with 
probability from formula (26), we know the formula ,
                   when ψ  is increasing, then the probability 
of click fraud
                      will reduce.           (QED)
2.4  Setting Supervision Model and Analysis with 
Competition
We will further extend the model as shown in the figure 
4 on online advertising service supply chain with two 
selected publisher P 1 and P 2, we now consider the 
influence due to the existence of P2 for P1, we now might 
as well suppose that Ads network takes the penalty 
Figure 3  
2-Supervision Game Model1on  
Assuming ads network chooses supervision with 
probability χ , and then trusting publisher without 
supervising probability is 1− χ , assuming publisher 
chooses to publish honestly with probability y, and then 
probability of click fraud is 1− y , so the expected benefit 
of Ads network can be expressed as follows:
π'A(χ , y) = χyπ'A1 + χ(1 − y)π'A2 + (1 − χ)yπ'A3 + (1 − χ)(1 − 
y)π'A4                                                                              (22) 
Put formula (14), (16), (18) and (20) into formula (22), 
and we can rewrite formula (22) as follows:                
(23)
And then differentiating (23) with respect to , we have the 
first-order conditions and get the formula as follows:
  
Solving equation above, we can get y' * as follows:
Expected benefit of publisher can be expressed as formula 
(24):
π'p(χ , y) = χyπ'p1 + χ(1 − y)π'p2 + (1 − χ)yπ'p3 + (1 − χ)(1 − y)
π'p4                                                                                  (24)
Put formulas (15), (17), (19) and (21) into formula (24), 
and we can rewrite formula (24) as formula (25):
(25)
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strategy as follows: if P 1 can’t publish advertisement 
honestly, i.e. P1 makes click fraud, then the Ads network 
will choose P 2, and give up cooperation with P 1. 
According to the Folk Theorem, if players are patient 
enough in a multi-stage game, then there is a sub-game 
refined Nash equilibrium which is better than single-stage. 
Publisher will choose the scheme that maximizes total 
revenue in the long run. We define δ as the discount rate.
Figure 4  
Supervision of Click Fraud with Competition
Assuming publisher chooses to publish advertisement 
honestly, then publisher’ net benefit is πP1 = pn + σcn− 
bpn, assuming that publisher chooses to make click fraud 
and obtain additional benefit with Φ ; if Ads network 
chooses supervision, publisher making click fraud is found 
with probability αβω . Then the publisher suffers one-off 
from penalty θ , after Ads network found publisher made 
click fraud, taking additional penalty, i.e. cooperation with 
publisher in the subsequent, Ads network will reduce the 
benefit for publisher, supposing the benefit for publisher is 
only η and 0 ≤ η ≤ pn + σcn− bpn.
In the case that Ads network chooses supervision, if 
the publisher chooses to publish advertisement honestly, 
assuming πL
1 is the expected long-term benefits for 
publisher, if publisher chooses making click fraud, then its 
expected benefits is πS
1, so we can get the formulas (27) 
and (28) respectively as follows:
(27)
(28)
In the case that  Ads network doesn’t  choose 
supervision, if the publisher chooses publishing 
advertising honestly, assuming πL
2 is the expected long-
term benefits for publisher, if publisher chooses to make 
click fraud, then its expected benefits is πS
2, so we can get 
the formulas (29) and (30) respectively as follows:
(29)
(30)
So the expected benefit for the publisher is P1 as follows:
(31)
Because the Ads network has multi-publisher available, 
the revenue function is unchanged for Ads network. And 
then differentiating formula (31) with respect to y , we 
have the first-order conditions and get the formula as 
follows:
(32)
Proposition 5 The more severe additional penalty η , the 
greater discount rate δ , and then the lower probability of 
supervision for the Ads network.
Proof. Formula (32) consists of three terms: the first 
term represents the contribution for additional penalty; 
the 2nd term represents the contribution for revenue of 
click fraud; and the third term represents the contribution 
for the publisher publishing advertising honestly. The 
more severe additional penalty i.e. η  is, then the smaller 
contribution additional penalty factor, therefore, χ  is 
smaller.
Differentiating formula (32) with respect to δ , we have
Therefore, we can get          due to assumption  0 ≤ η ≤ πP1 
So, with the increased discount rate δ , the lower 
probability of supervision that Ads network chooses 
supervision.
3.  MANAGEMENT INSIGHTS
Monitoring click fraud is very difficult and complicated 
for Ads network, due to characteristics with concealment 
and across time-space for network, especially owing 
to advances in modern information technology which 
provide much convenience for the click fraud. Therefore, 
it needs the support of technology and management 
mechanism designed for supervising click fraud. It will 
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flow easily in theory because of backward technology 
of supervision, and unsound management mechanism of 
monitoring. According to the analysis of the model above, 
we propose the management insights as following:
(1) Ads network needs to invest certain human and 
material costs, to improve advanced technology and set up 
effective supervision system and management mechanism 
to prevent click fraud.
(2) Strengthen the supervision and control in the 
process of cooperation with publisher and reducing the 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is the 
main factor which causes click fraud when Ads network 
assigns publishing advertising to publisher. Therefore, it 
can reduce the probability of click fraud by decreasing the 
information asymmetry on both sides. It can reinforce the 
supervision and control over publisher by strengthening 
the comprehensive analysis of qualification, credibility 
and historical information, and by building shared 
management information system, 
(3) Build appropriate competition mechanism. The 
Ads network should make more publishers join in 
Ads network, and keep in touch with advertiser. It can 
foster competition mechanism and competitive pressure 
by assigning advertisement publishing to different 
publishers. And at the same time, Ads network should 
build comprehensive evaluation system and appropriate 
elimination mechanism to encourage publisher to publish 
advertisement honestly and reduce the probability of click 
fraud.
(4) Combine the penalty mechanism that advertiser 
uses to punish the Ads network with the mechanism that 
the Ads network uses to punish publisher. Only when all 
the members of supply chain have gained the benefits 
must they make efforts on supervision to maximize 
the profit. Therefore, all situations should be taken into 
consideration in advance of prior-contract. In the contract, 
it must define the rights and obligations which the partners 
must abide by in the contract, and specify clear penalty 
standard, too. For standards on contract ensure execution 
in argument of parties.
(5) Evaluate the performance of online advertising 
in the process of publishing. Check the effectiveness of 
advertising periodically, and find the issues existing in 
click fraud in time. If there is click fraud, the Ads network 
should make punishment immediately according to the 
contract or suspend cooperation with the publisher to 
avoid suffering more losses for the advertiser.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Click fraud is currently the most threatening challenge 
in online advertising market. Only by strengthening the 
supervision and management can the advertisers avoid 
suffering loss, and can Internet advertising market be 
made sound and clean. We build the basic supervision 
model of click fraud among the Ads network, publisher 
and advertisers based on the game theory, extend the basic 
game model to 2-supervision model among advertisers, 
Ads network and publisher, and extend the basic 
game model to 2-supervision model accompany with 
competition. Our studies focus on the relationship between 
α , β , ω , θ , Φ , ψ  on the probability of supervision for Ads 
network and probability of click fraud respectively.
This study is limited to the supervision game 
among advertisers, Ads networks and publisher without 
consideration supervision for competitors of advertisers 
and competitors of Ads network and other stakeholders, 
which will involve the supervision of the multi-
dimensional game and will also be worthy of further 
study. In the process of actual publishing advertising, 
there is possibility that the Ads network unite for publisher 
to make click fraud. Therefore, it is worthy of further 
research on co-click fraud.
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